From Smederevka, through Rama at the head of NATO, to Ceca’s helicopter—when Balkan humor gets out of hand

When most media outlets in Macedonia reported that Smederevka from the Balkans, which costs half a euro, was being sold in France like Burgundy wine for 250 euros, few people doubted the story. It was not the first or second time that local resources had been more successfully used by foreign companies. Discussions about ajvar and Alshar immediately began…

The news from the Serbian online wine magazine “Vino & Fino” was first reported by several Serbian media outlets, but Macedonian media outlets immediately picked it up and spread it widely.

Headlines exploded:

“Scandal in France: Macedonian Smederevka sold as Burgundy wine for 250 euros per liter!” “French wine scandal–Macedonian Smederevka sold as premium Burgudny wine,” ” The French sold Macedonian wine as their own,” “French wines were filled with Macedonian Smederevka from Mrzenci,” “Europol: Macedonian Smederevka was sold as French wine,” “At Mr. Gjoko’s place in Mrzenci it costs 0.5 euros, and the same wine in France 250 euros…” But there were also more moderare headlines, such as “Smederevka as a good alternative to French wines, sold for 250 euros.”

 

The text was full of details. From the Europol investigation, to statements from “Mr. Gjoko from Mrzenci,” whose wine “made it to Burgundy,” and a French oenologist who extensively described the characteristics of both regions and their respective wines. In their excitement, media paid little attention to the details. Neither to the correct pronunciation of “Chablis” (shah-blee) and “Montrachet” (mon-rah-shay), nor to the oenologist’s name–Tele Repomashe, which those more confident in their French pronunciation transcribed as Tele Repomash. It never occurred to them that the name is pronounced exactly as it is written, just like the Serbian phrase “tele-repom-maše,” meaning: a calf waves its tail. They also missed another important detail–the date: April 1st.

While “Vino & Fino” politely published in the afternoon that the article was an April Fool’s joke, the “scandal” had already been picked up by almost all Macedonian media—especially online. Most ran completely identical headlines, many copied the text word for word, and not a single one verified the claims from the Serbian media.

 

An unintentional textbook example of information manipulation

Although it was an April Fool’s joke, and a masterful one at that, the elements it contained and the way it spread and went viral unintentionally make the story of Smederevka a textbook example of information manipulation.

A surprising headline, a provocative topic, and emotional hooks made the story irresistible both to the audience and to the media, which, lacking time, capacity, or sufficient professionalism to verify it, simply passed it on. In this way, the story spreads spontaneously, without the need for any special channels for distributing disinformation. On top of that, different media emphasize different aspects of the story, giving it a certain “spin” or angle. As a result, the media naturally cluster—from outlets that accurately but unfortunately relayed false news, to groups of media with shared ownership, ideology, or political orientation that added their own perspective, to those that simply copy the text word for word. The spread is further amplified through social media, where users, unlike traditional media, have no obligation to verify a story before sharing it.

„This news ties into the widely accepted narrative that Macedonia, although geographically small, has a rich tradition of delicious food and drinks of world-class quality. Such news knows no borders because it is potentially viral and is often published by tabloid media. These outlets frequently publish sensational and provocative content aimed at attracting attention, using various techniques to make information go viral, such as clickbait headlines, polarizing stories, sensationalist topics and events, and so on. In Macedonia, the influence of online media from the region is still strong, and content easily spills over from one linguistic sphere to another, most often from Serbia, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Albania,” explains university professor Sead Dzigal, a communications expert.

According to the professor, the main reasons for both its spread, as well as for the dissemination of disinformation during what is today called foreign interference and manipulation of information (FIMI), are low professional standards, low media literacy, and narratives designed to provoke strong emotions, as well as the use of polarizing topics. Disinformation spreads through clusters of tabloid and propaganda media and easily spills over regionally due to their strong influence.

“These entertaining and seemingly harmless pieces of disinformation are quite common and appear periodically depending on the context of events. Many examples are well known, such as fake prize draws, celebrity news, fake medicines, recommendations motivated by superstition, or sensational news, for instance, the escape of a lion from the Bitola zoo a few years ago,” says communications expert Sead Dzigal, a university professor.

Undoubtedly, the story about Smederevka was intended as a harmless joke, without any “malicious” intent. Yet, even as such, it takes on a sensationalist, and at times even political, “spin” in the various media outlets that report it.

These “distortions” are even more pronounced in other April Fool’s jokes in the region, which, unlike the Smederevka story, also elicited political reactions—exactly the goal of any campaign of information interference and manipulation. A handful of such pranks went so far as to generate hundreds of media reports and undoubtedly reach a million-strong audience.

 

April fool’s jokes as a tradition: Ceca’s Chinese helicopter and Montenegro’s economic program

April Fool’s jokes used to be a regular ritual in the media across the region. Today, Podgorica’s “Vijesti” is one of the few outlets that still maintains this tradition, often provoking serious reactions—from the public, politicians, and even state authorities in Montenegro, as well as in the wider region.

For example, in 2011, during the first year of the online edition Vijesti.me, they published a story claiming that Ceca Ražnatović, who was facing a court case in Serbia, was applying for Montenegrin citizenship. The outlet announced that Ceca would arrive at Tivat Airport from Ljubljana in a Chinese helicopter. The post, published at 2 a.m. on April 1 by the author P. Travanj (Travanj = April), had already fooled over 5,000 people by morning—ranging from those who “moved” abroad in outrage, politicians threatening to revoke citizenship, to correspondents preparing at Tivat Airport to welcome Ceca’s flight. Before “Vijesti” could manage to clarify that the text was a traditional April Fool’s joke, Serbian media had already taken a statement from their Minister of Internal Affairs, Ivica Dačić, while the Montenegrin Ministry of Interior issued a statement expressing outrage at the “mockery” of authorities issuing personal documents, as well as of the citizens.

 

Last year, “Vijesti” carried out perhaps its most successful April Fool’s joke to date. The post claiming that Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina „had requested to copy“ Montenegro’s economic program “Europe Now” fooled more than 63,000 visitors on the Podgorica-based media outlet’s website, generated around 430 reactions, and over 100 comments. Yet the actual impact was far greater.

The second post, in which Vijesti published “aprillili…” [“April Fools!”], received nearly 45,000 views on the newspaper’s website alone.

In the article, a “source involved in the negotiations” claims that Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić asked Finance Minister Siniša Mali and Prime Minister Miloš Vučević to keep the “copying” secret and to give the project a new name, so that it would not be associated with Montenegro’s program. If it were to be linked anyway, the article masterfully reports, Vučić allegedly instructed the ministers to claim that Montenegro copied from Serbia and that the Serbian program was “faster, better, and bigger.” The president also reportedly ordered that Serbia implement the program before it was adopted in Bosnia, so they could claim that Bosnians had copied from them. And, Vučić added, Serbian salaries should be at least ten euros higher.

Like the Smederevka story, the article about the economic program is full of details, which lends it plausibility; it cites statements and references institutions, giving it credibility, authenticity, and authority.

Most importantly, the post plays on national pride—encouraging it in some, provoking it in others. This is precisely what triggered the strongest reactions.

Siniša Mali reacted immediately, and Serbian pro-government media outlets almost simultaneously reported it. In a long Facebook post, Mali provided a detailed description of the Serbian government’s measures and programs, along with the results that, according to him, put Serbia “far ahead of everyone in the region, together”—almost like the story in Vijesti.

However, not all jokes are successful. Some barely elicit a smile, like an awkward joke by a Serbian tabloid claiming that Bosnia and Herzegovina had banned cheese-filled burek. In Croatia, the government and HDZ criticized the portal Penzija (mirovina.hr) for a joke about a canceled pension bonus. Others are outright tasteless, such as the hoax about a planted bomb that emptied three schools in Bihać, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 

Rama at the head of NATO, the prankster on the stake

Probably no recent April Fool’s joke had as much impact as the post claiming that Edi Rama would become Secretary General of NATO.

Barely two hours past midnight on April 1, 2022, user Suzana Starikov tweeted on “X”:

„Edi Rama will succeed Jens Stoltenberg as NATO Secretary General. The US in particular is said to have insisted on electing the next NATO Secretary General among the new NATO members. The candidates were Estonia’s PM Katja Kalas and Albania’s Prime Minister Edi Rama. Who will be the next Albanian PM?“ (Kaja Kallas, today EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security, editor’s note)

Within the next 24 hours, the post became a textbook example of information manipulation, ticking every box on the list: from social media publication, to “laundering” the story, and building, or undermining—the credibility of the source. The tweet perfectly and crystal-clear demonstrated the unprofessionalism and bias of the media, as well as the polarization of society, both locally and across the region.

„German analyst, academic, and researcher Suzana Starikov claims that Edi Rama is the next Secretary General of NATO after Jens Stoltenberg” had already appeared by morning as a headline in several Tirana media outlets.

„O.K. folks, this is an April fool’s trick (of course!). I wouldn’t explain this, but I had to do it, because some Albanian language media outlets published the tweet without any research–they even picked up my spelling mistakes in the name of the Estonian PM in their news,” Suzana tweeted again.

But it was already too late. The news was widely picked up by dozens of Albanian-language media outlets. It crossed borders and spread to Kosovo, as well as to North Macedonia and Serbia. While Starikov was trying to correct the Albanian-language media outlets, the “story” began to be picked up by Serbian-language outlets in the region. By the end of the day, Macedonian media had also carried the “story.”

Seeing that the Balkans had taken the joke seriously, the would-be jokester continued tweeting that she had only been joking and that the media should not report claims without verifying them—but to no avail. The “news” about Edi’s appointment as head of NATO, supposedly backed by the Americans, was already in dozens of media outlets in the region, in three languages, seen several hundred thousand times, with thousands of shares and hundreds of comments.

Meanwhile, some readers of the Albanian media outlets began leaving comments claiming that the author was, in fact, Suzana Skenderi, a translator from Tirana married and living in Germany.

 

While the fire sparked by Suzana was raging across the Balkans, Albanian-language media outlets began to characterize the source in different ways. From the very beginning, the Albanian-language outlets split along clear lines: in describing the source, some used the phrase “the well-known German analyst, academic, and researcher,” while others called her “a translator from Germany.” By the end of the day, however, once they finally accepted that it had been a joke, all of them jointly attacked her for spreading fake news.

Macedonia, too, from time to time bears witness to disinformation that originates on social media and then gains traction in the media. In February 2022, a joke surfaced in Bitola claiming that a lion had escaped from the zoo. For several days it was a main topic of conversation among the people of Bitola, until the situation was clarified by the police and local authorities.

Fishing for emotional “hooks”

What do all these stories have in common, and why did they go viral? First, there is the topic itself, which is meant to provoke surprise and interest, but also to be polarizing, that is, to contain emotional “hooks” on which the reader can latch: touching on national pride, culture, tradition, or some other value close to the target audience. Most often, a large portion of the media also latch onto the same “hooks,” and then “free of charge” spread the story even more widely—this being the second element in the mechanism of dissemination. In addition to the media that latch on spontaneously, the disinformation is further spread, each from its own angle, by clusters of politically, economically, or ideologically aligned outlets, which constitute the third element in the chain, with the fourth being social media users. The fifth element in the story is the readers, especially those with a low level of information culture, or “media literacy,” who eagerly “swallow” the story and wholeheartedly share it.

Disinformation is simple, emotional, and often uses stylistic devices to emphasize its message. It contains an “emotional hook” that “fishes” for ethnic, political, historical, or cultural sentiments, as highlighted in the analysis “Foreign Interference and Manipulation of Information.” Disinformation is often disseminated from a single center (Belgrade, Tirana) and then spreads across the region, local media outlets pick it up without verification due to limited resources and capacities.

The main sources of disinformation and FIMI  are online media outlets and social networks, amplified by so-called “bots” and coordinated activities designed to exploit algorithms. Many online outlets are anonymous and sensationalist, while political bias, polarization, and low media literacy in society increase vulnerability and enable the spread of SMIs. Citizens believe they can recognize false media content, but very few actually verify it.

Local communities are the first to be affected, due to ethnic, political, and cultural differences. The Macedonian media system, subject to economic and political influence and lacking strong regulatory mechanisms, combined with distrust in institutions and political polarization, increases susceptibility to manipulation.

Disinformation is formulated in a simple and emotional manner, which makes it more accessible and influential to the general public. It articulates emotions, evokes empathy, attacks values, and undermines trust. It is often stylistically well-crafted, using hyperbole, inappropriate comparisons, omitting key points that could change the course of the argument or thesis, and emphasizing problematic aspects that serve its objectives,” the study emphasizes.

But they also have another, essential element—the so-called emotional “hook”: “Even when there is no direct connection, they imply ethnic issues, political frustrations, and historically sensitive topics,” the analysis states.

This analysis also emphasizes the strong mutual influence of the countries in the region and the spillover of disinformation.

Of around twenty studies from the region examining the problem of disinformation, one explains it particularly briefly and precisely—the analytical report by the Center for Information, Democracy, and Citizenship at the American University in Bulgaria, prepared by the Working Group on Disinformation in Albania. Although it focuses on the situation in Albania, the elements, techniques, and mechanisms it describes are universal for the region.

The group identified a series of elements in the dissemination of disinformation. Linguistic patterns present issues through binary oppositions (bipolar opposition), portraying the world in clear, opposing pairs: good–bad, us–them, patriots–traitors, democrats–anti-democrats, East–West. This rhetorical device is meant to polarize and simplify complex topics, leaving no room for doubt.

Another element is the stirring of emotions (emotional triggering). Among the techniques used are constant, repeated intimidation, as well as ‘anger framing’—that is, claims designed to provoke anger toward specific groups, such as politicians, ethnic groups, migrants, foreigners…

Effective techniques also include personalization, in which fabricated testimonies are presented, as well as anecdotal “evidence” instead of scientific or statistical data. To create a sense of intimacy, or even greater personalization, the stories are woven around the ordinary citizen.

Finally, conspiratorial logic is applied, linking unrelated events into convincing but inaccurate narratives, most often about hidden, powerful structures that control events.

“Virtually every one of these elements, of course driven by different motives, is present in the story about Smederevka. From the opposition between the West and the Balkans, through the anger over the economic exploitation of wine that costs half a euro and is sold for 250, to apparent testimonies from Mr. Gjoko, the ordinary citizen, and the oenologist, and finally to “evidence” in the form of a Europol investigation.

Last, but no less important, a characteristic of disinformation is the high adaptability of the narrative and its evolution over the course of “retelling,” a path that “Smederevka” also followed.

“Disinformation actors quickly adapt their language and narrative to current events,” the analysis notes, “and the language is adjusted to fit the stylistic norms of each platform to which the story migrates”—from TikTok memes, through long debates on Facebook, to pseudo-academic discourses on Telegram…

The last element is localization, where global disinformation motifs are systematically adapted for a specific region through its particular cultural codes, linguistic references, and historical analogies.

In addition to content, techniques are also copied

All of these elements and tactics, as well as the entire mechanism for spreading disinformation, are almost regularly observed in reported cases of disinformation in the region.

In Albania, the organizations Faktoje and SEE Check recorded more than a thousand cases of fake or manipulative visual posts on Instagram in 2024, including viral videos that falsely claimed that the European Union had banned Albanian products. This content uses the same emotional rhetoric as the previous ones–invoking national pride and disenfranchisement, without basic fact-checking. The mechanism and techniques are well described by the Working Group on Disinformation in Albania, which also concludes that the centralization of media in Tirana leaves a vacuum in the rest of the country, the ideological ownership of media groups enables the unhindered spread of biased and misleading content, and the media, in general, serves as amplifiers of political party messages or for the dissemination of “clickbait” content. The TikTok platform is cited as a “critical vector” for the spread of disinformation, especially among young people, but the government’s campaign to abolish it is assessed as undemocratic. According to the Group, influencers, entertainers, pseudo-experts, as well as Facebook groups and messaging apps, also play an important role. Among the existing disinformation topics, however, are conspiracy theories about Covid-19 and health topics, theories related to Soros, the war in Ukraine, integration into the European Union…

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the platform Raskrinkavanje analyzed more than 3,700 news stories and found that much of the ethno-nationalist disinformation begins as jokes or memes, which then turn into “real” news on local online media outlets. Raskrinkavanje also has a special section for satire, and it covers disinformation that is “off the deep end,” such as the story of a man who identified himself as a deer and was shot by hunters. The platform pays particular attention to social networks. Raskrinkavanje has so far analyzed more than 3,900 posts on Facebook, and TikTok has been identified as a new and particularly fast tool for distributing such content, which shows how quickly a humorous context can turn into a political narrative.

Kosovo is a battlefield for disinformation from Serbian and Albanian-language media outlets. Among the narratives, according to the Disinformation and Civil Society Mapping Report by Metamorphosis, are those that the formation of a community of Serbian municipalities means that Kosovo has surrendered to Serbia, or that the US is not protecting Muslims, which is being spread by disinformation about the conflict in Gaza. The series continues with accusations of a “mafia state” and transmitted Russian narratives from the Serbian side, or posts about the alleged deployment of the Serbian army on the border with Kosovo during the 2022 elections in Serbia, noted in the analysis “Geopolitical Perspective of Disinformation Flows in the Western Balkans.” After the incident in Banjska (2023), however, a large influx of disinformation was observed that appeared in Serbian groups on Facebook, and then within just a few hours was taken over and transmitted in Albanian by local Kosovo portals. This mechanism of rapid spillover and repackaging of content is identical to that of the Smederevka story.
In Montenegro, the Podgorica-based newspaper Vijesti has long been known for its April Fools’ Day jokes, including one about “the EU allegedly introducing a tax on rakija.” This post, although intended as humor, was reprinted by several regional media outlets and turned into “news” that Brussels was interfering in the traditions of the Balkans—the same type of satirical-political escalation that we see in the Smederevka story. But jokes aside, the Montenegrin Digital Forensic Center last year analyzed more than 62,000 national and regional media posts and concluded that 22 percent contained some form of manipulation.

Disinformation is transmitted through groups of media outlets that are politically, economically, or ideologically close, and that take over each other’s content. By multiplying news, they try to flood the information space and “hack” the algorithms of aggregators and social networks.

“A series of studies confirm that there are clusters of media outlets that create such content and are part of broader global turmoil and events. For example, the main regional media outlets that broadcast pro-Russian and anti-Western content about the war in Ukraine are more or less known and mapped, clusters of media outlets that only report positively and uncritically about China, then networks that are considered conservative and illiberal, media outlets with a pronounced liberal or leftist ideology and a number of others,” explains Dzigal, who states that he has confirmed knowledge of Russian and Chinese influence in the media, as well as pro-Western media outlets that often report uncritically and in a polarizing way. There are also regional groups that spread disinformation on ideological and religious grounds, while media outlets in the region are very susceptible to FIMI operations and manipulations, easily bribed and with poor standards in the area of ​​professional and ethical journalism.

The spread is indirectly but wholeheartedly assisted by “conventional” media outlets, which in the transformation into the internet era lost the editorial system and the previously established practices for filtering information.

Foreigners lie, but our own lie as well

The role of domestic liars in operations involving “information interference and manipulation” is also highlighted in the monitoring of influence and disinformation campaigns in the Western Balkans by the Berlin-based Institute for Strategic Dialogue. The institute conducted monitoring in Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo from December 23, 2023 to June 2024, in which it analyzed 31,048 Telegram messages, 27,644 Facebook posts, 478 YouTube videos, and 62 daily media outlets, with their Facebook and Instagram pages, with more than 7.2 million followers.

“Despite the differences between the four Balkan countries analyzed in this report, ISD research shows that disinformation in the region is primarily driven by leading politicians, parties, and media outlets, far more than by foreign state and non-state actors. While a number of such actors have overt or implicit ties to Russia, Kremlin-affiliated media sites and voices have had limited success compared to domestic actors, who have used social media platforms to promote a range of misleading or patently false claims, as well as polarizing content,” the monitoring report concludes.

The biggest disinformers, according to the research on the effect of disinformation and foreign influences, are domestic politicians, 89 percent of respondents said, and disinformation is mostly spread through media outlets (85 percent), social networks and internet portals (82 percent).

A total of 83 percent of citizens believe that disinformation is a serious problem, and every second person stated that at least once a week they have noticed a completely fabricated story about someone’s political goals or agendas.

Three-quarters of respondents believe that the Government should take measures against disinformation, and at least two-thirds believe that it is important for journalists to be professional, to constantly report on the harmfulness of disinformation, to increase awareness of disinformation, to pass a law to protect against disinformation, to promote media literacy, to have an independent organization verify information, and for citizens to verify their own information.

Legislation to prevent and combat disinformation is also a recommendation of the analytical report on foreign interference and manipulation of information, which, among other things, recommends educational campaigns, regional dialogue, and support from the European Union.

Key elements in the fight against disinformation are a comprehensive whole-of-society approach, coordinated action with an appropriate, proportionate budget, smart and strategic measures, and a joint, regional strategic approach, including a common regional strategy, as outlined in the Blueprint for Protection of Democracy from Information Threats of the Anti-Disinformation Network for the Balkans.

The need for a systemic approach is also emphasized in the recommendations for building social resilience, as well as in the legal measures for preventing and sanctioning of disinformation in the Disinformation and Civil Society Mapping Report, which also proposes support for media literacy and regulation of online platforms.

The best way to prevent disinformation, according to Professor Dzigal, is to simply verify the information:

“In the race for fast, attention-grabbing news, this key rule is often ignored, which is why many such cases occur. The professional and ethical duty of a journalist is to check the news, find the sources of information, and attach their name to the published news, thereby guaranteeing its accuracy and professionalism. Journalists should act as professional communicators who uphold these standards, which are essential for public trust in anyone publishing content to inform society,” says Professor Dzigal.

Author: Igor K. Ilievski