Interethnic relations lost in the Bermuda Triangle between the government, media and social media

Interethnic relations in North Macedonia, besides being crucial for building a cohesive society, are often abused to maintain negative political development. For decades, we have witnessed ups and downs that always and without exception create a wall between the problems that actually bother citizens and the problems that citizens talk about. Thus, even though through numerous public opinion surveys citizens state that their priority problems are poverty, salaries, living standards, on the other hand, interethnic relations and political turmoil dominate the public discourse

 

Such public discourse, in which interethnic issues are central, encourages ethnonationalist echo-chambers that amplify nationalist speech, hate speech, and speech that widens the gap of divisions between the two groups. Such a gap, in the absence of dialogue and access to information, is filled with disinformation and manipulation of information. These in turn serve to feed harmful narratives in society, especially the “us versus them” narrative. Such daily exposure of citizens can lead to radicalization with potentially violent elements.

This analysis examines the existence of a public sphere that, whether stimulated or organized, contributes to strengthening of nationalism. It explores the relationship between the topics dominating public discourse in North Macedonia, the actors promoting them, and the echo chambers used to disseminate disinformation or manipulated information. Ultimately, the analysis also aims to determine whether there are legislative gaps enabling the dissemination of disinformation and manipulative content that contribute to harmful narratives, and if so, to define where these gaps exist and how they can be addressed.

 

How We Conducted the Research?

The methodology for this analysis consisted of desk research, mapping, and media monitoring. The primary database included publicly accessible social media pages that share and disseminate content containing disinformation or manipulative information that incites ethnic tensions. The methodology followed the publicly available path of a piece of information. Finally, through comparative analysis of existing domestic regulations and international regulatory frameworks, the study sought to develop policy recommendations to reduce the space for harmful narratives to spread.

 

What We Found?

It is worth noting that public discourse surrounding tense interethnic issues reaches its peak during election campaigns, as political parties use such topics to mobilize their supporters. More than half a year ago, North Macedonia held parliamentary and presidential elections with overlapping campaign periods. During these campaigns, nationalist rhetoric and divisive discourse were not only present, but interethnic relations were placed at the center of political party campaigns. This culminated in direct and open threats, which were transmitted through the media to supporters and the broader public.

Although the current governing coalition —which holds a large, nearly two-thirds majority in Parliament and also controls the majority of municipalities in the country— is itself ethnically mixed, interethnic topics still dominate public discourse. The reasons for this lie partly in differences in the political programs pursued by the coalition parties, but also in their ideological orientation, which ranges from the center toward the right of the political spectrum. The most important reason, however, remains the use of interethnic issues to fill the absence of substantive and policy-based discussions.

Such political statements are transmitted and amplified by the media, additionally encouraging inflammatory media reports and statements by analysts and experts, further worsening interethnic relations.

An important finding of this analysis is the timing overlap between media reports and posts by groups and public Facebook pages containing disinformation or manipulative political content with elements of hate speech or inflammatory rhetoric. The content supports the harmful “us versus them” narrative. These groups and public Facebook pages function as echo chambers for their audiences, while also coordinating mutual content sharing that increases the visibility of such material. Considering their number of followers and coordinated sharing practices, they reach large audiences and effectively function as unregulated media outlets.

The content analyzed in this study was linked to posts concerning the opening of Albanian Academy of Sciences and Arts, where the renewed relevance of an interethnic issue was used to spread hate speech or inflammatory rhetoric that fueled interethnic tensions between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians, which contributed to further radicalization and harmful narratives.

A connection was identified among 11 different public Facebook pages and several Facebook groups that have mutually shared content. Besides the pages themselves, the content was also shared by recurring individual profiles, although those profiles were not the focus of this analysis. For example, the analyzed content of a single post related to the opening of the Albanian Academy of Sciences and Arts, shared by 10 pages, collectively reached more than 199,000 followers — a larger reach than the Facebook pages of most media outlets in the country.

Analysis

There is a clear chronological overlap between statements made by politicians, the topics dominating public discourse through media coverage, and the inflammatory content published by publicly accessible social media pages that systematically share content among themselves while functioning as media-like actors.

We analyzed two Facebook posts whose content contributed to strengthening the harmful “us versus them” narrative. The findings indicate a coordinated connection among 11 Facebook pages that systematically shared each other’s posts, increasing the visibility of the content. Although the pages appeared similar and frequently shared identical posts, there were differences in likes, follower counts, interactions, and comments. Only three of these pages were actively engaged, meaning they generated comments and reactions. It is also notable that the content from these posts was shared outside standard working hours.

Two examples of posts were selected and chronologically connected to demonstrate the link between Facebook page activity and the timing of political statements, media articles, and analytical commentary on the topics addressed in the posts. The selected examples concerned manipulative claims alleging that the Albanian Academy of Sciences would be used to promote irredentism, or that such an academy would be used to federalize the country.

 

The Media Environment

Disagreements within the governing coalition regarding the establishment of an Albanian Academy of Sciences and Arts first emerged in July 2024, when the coalition partner VLEN announced that it was beginning the process of establishing such an academy. Their coalition partner ZNAM responded that “the announcements about an Albanian academy are post-election populism,” while the Prime Minister and leader of the third coalition partner, VMRO-DPMNE, stated: “The idea will remain only an idea: VLEN’s request for an Albanian Academy of Sciences and Arts will not be realized — the initiative is folklore and a political maneuver.” In essence, this represented a continuation of the hardline positions all three parties had taken during the election campaign period.

Three months later, when the first concrete steps toward implementation were initiated, disagreements resurfaced within the coalition. One headline read: “The VLEN coalition once again revived the idea of an Albanian Academy of Sciences,” while another stated: “Mickoski: There is only one Academy of Sciences and Arts.” These conflicting governmental positions, expressed over just two days — October 15 and 16, 2024 — created a tense atmosphere further intensified by provocative headlines taken from columns and statements by experts and analysts:

• “VLEN does not give up on the Albanian Academy of Sciences and Arts”
• “The meaningless reality of science according to Badinter”
• “If we had listened to them, we would have neither schools nor universities”

These articles were published between October 15 and November 2, 2024, meaning that conflicting positions continued to sustain tensions in the media for weeks after the issue first escalated.

We mapped the movement of information through public Facebook pages (echo chambers) using two posts published on two different Facebook pages.

The first post spreads disinformation by warning that ethnic Albanians are allegedly exploiting propaganda portraying themselves as victims of injustice in order to push activities and goals aimed at federalization as a prelude to secession. It alludes to stripping competencies from Albanian mayors because of the announcement that the Albanian Academy would be financed from the budgets of municipalities headed by Albanian mayors. This disinformation was published on October 16, during the public debate in which, as already established, disagreements existed among the ruling coalition partners regarding the formation of the Academy.

This post has 10 shares, 6 of which are public, including the pages “Ludata Joci Fan Club,” “Nalet da se storite,” “Sekula vojvoda fan club,” and “Bebo,” as well as two individual personal profiles.

Овој пост има 10 споделувања, од кои 6 се јавни, меѓу кои се страниците: „Лудата Јоци Фан Клуб“, „Налет да се сторите“ „Sekula vojvoda fan club“ и „Бебо“ и два лични индивидуални профила.

Together, these four public Facebook pages have more than 70,000 followers, while together with the original page “Selo gori baba se cheshla” they have around 80,000 followers. The comments under these posts are, as expected, inflammatory and contain elements of hate speech. These posts were mainly published on October 16, 2024, in the period between 08:07 and 09:34 in the morning (with the exception of one page that posted on October 17).

The second post appeared on the public Facebook page “Cicki.mk” [vulgar term for women’s breasts] from which there were 29 shares, 12 of them publicly accessible.

Of these 12 shares, three were in Facebook groups, one was shared by an individual personal profile, while the rest were Facebook pages, including four overlapping with the previous ones — “Ludata Joci Fan Club,” “Nalet da se storite,” “Sekula vojvoda fan club,” and “Bebo.” The remaining pages were “Cyber Club Ludata Joci,” “Vidi vidi,” “Kukuzel,” “LeLe,” “Jovan Kukuzel,” and the Facebook groups “Political Posts Republic of Macedonia,” “Zoran Zaev Traitor Number 1,” and “Chernyy yumor 18+.” Together, these pages and groups that use Macedonian language have more than 213,000 followers, while the last one, which mainly contains Russian-language content, has more than 143,000 followers.

The posts and shares mainly began on October 18, 2024, at around 2:00 a.m. and continued primarily until October 19, 2024, from which we can conclude that they occurred in parallel with the media reports and statements of political parties during that period.

What Does All This Mean? 

Public discourse marked by strong polarization and tension around interethnic issues begins with statements from parties within the ruling coalition and is reinforced through media coverage that turns the issue into a dominant topic in public discourse, with some outlets additionally using inflammatory language.

Subsequently, the same discourse becomes part of discussions on social networks, including through comments under media posts on social media profiles. Public Facebook pages and groups exploit the momentum created by such public discourse and produce disinformation content or manipulations of information, which they systematically share among themselves, creating echo chambers and amplifying the content. Through this infrastructure, they disseminate the material to hundreds of thousands of followers.

The examined disinformation and manipulations contain extremely inflammatory rhetoric that radicalizes and contributes to the harmful “us versus them” narrative, while also implying and reinforcing numerous sub-narratives. Examples include the sub-narrative of Albanian irredentism and secession, or the sub-narrative of federalization.

 

Policy Recommendations 

At first glance, it is clear that antidemocratic actors have been abusing the unregulated online space to create pages that function as echo chambers and collectively operate as media outlets. However, comparative analysis shows that regulation is not a comprehensive solution to the problem, and that it must be addressed from all sides of society and through different approaches.

On the issue of legislation: North Macedonia, which seeks to begin negotiations for membership in the European Union, should already have implemented some regulations even before becoming a member state. In relation to social media, preparations should already be underway for the harmonization with the Digital Services Act, which addresses several issues related to large online platforms, including the handling of potentially harmful content through a liability regime for online content providers.

However, even without introducing new regulation, North Macedonia already has legal provisions at its disposal, provided that institutions possess the political will to address the harmful impacts of information manipulation and disinformation. The Criminal Code sanctions hate speech and discriminatory speech through Article 319, which concerns inciting national, racial, and religious hatred, discord, and intolerance, while Articles 26, 27, 27a, and 28 contain special provisions on criminal liability for offenses committed through means of public information. The implementation of these provisions requires intensified cooperation between the Ministry of Interior and the Public Prosecutor’s Office in this field, as well as the establishment of dedicated units focused exclusively on this issue, which currently do not exist.

However, regulation is not everything, because there are also softer measures institutions can undertake relating to public communication and responsibility for the public sphere that influences citizens. The Public Prosecutor’s Office could play a preventive role in society through regular public communication aimed at educating and informing citizens about the harmful consequences of disinformation and its punishability, thereby adopting a proactive rather than reactive role. The same proactive role could also be assumed by regulatory agencies such as the Agency for Audio and Audiovisual Media Services (AVMU), and in this case also the State Election Commission (SEC), given that the escalation of interethnic rhetoric reaches its peak during election periods, meaning that what we are analyzing today is part of a broader cause-and-effect problem.

Naturally, the most important and most responsible role belongs to the ruling coalition itself, which through its public statements opens and keeps alive tensions on the interethnic level, as established through the media monitoring conducted in this analysis. The ruling coalition, composed of three partner political parties, must establish internal dialogue through which disagreements can be resolved and a unified governmental position agreed upon, while behaving responsibly toward the public on issues concerning interethnic relations. After all, this is the same strategy it uses for other political issues within the Government where no public disagreements are allowed.

In addition to institutions, as established through the media monitoring, the second most responsible role belongs to the media outlets, where self-regulation is evidently failing completely in its inability to distinguish professional media — which maintain certain standards — from those that do not practice them for various reasons. The absence of sanctions against media outlets that create disinformation or manipulate information within the self-regulatory process is evident.

Finally, while recognizing the lack of resources within institutions, but also noting the difference compared to more developed countries, we highlight the sensitivity of society toward inflammatory rhetoric, due to which numerous academic, media, and civil society organizations engage in mapping and researching such phenomena. The mapping and labeling of the above-mentioned echo chambers, for the sake of transparency toward audiences, helps in two ways. First, through its informative and educational dimension, by warning citizens, media, and academia about the type of content and its effects; and second, because such mapping can later serve institutions that determine there are elements warranting prosecution.

 

 

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