Mickoski’s interview with Breitbart: Manipulations, facts and spins in the story of Washington and the EU

The most important spin in Mickoski’s interview with the American news outlet Breitbart is not the claim that North Macedonia should have close ties with the United States. The problem arises when political closeness with Washington is presented as a new mechanism for resolving issues related to the country’s European integration. North Macedonia can be both a strong US ally and continue its path towards the EU. But the latter involves specific procedures, conditions and agreements. At present, these include constitutional amendments agreed as part of the negotiating framework, as well as progress in the rule of law, judicial independence, the fight against corruption and other areas of reform 

   

Author: Ana Anastasovska

 

In an interview with the American news outlet Breitbart, published on 24 August 2026, Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski presented North Macedonia as a close ally of the Donald Trump administration, while at the same time saying that membership in the European Union remains a strategic goal, although a “second milestone.”

Mickoski also offered his own interpretation of the history of European integration: that the country had fulfilled the conditions for years, that new conditions were imposed again after the dispute with Greece was resolved, and that Brussels and Sofia are blocking the process.

Some of the criticism has a real basis. North Macedonia has indeed been waiting for years for progress towards EU membership, while the Bulgarian blockade has seriously undermined the credibility of the enlargement process. However, in the interview, the prime minister presents the United States and the Trump administration as the “highest priority” and suggests that this policy is what should help North Macedonia unblock its path towards the EU, although nowhere does he explain how this would actually be put into practice.

   

Did Brussels promise that the name change was the “last obstacle”? 

Mickoski says Macedonia was told the name change would be the last thing it needed to do, after which “Brussels lied to us and betrayed us.”

It is a fact that, following the Prespa Agreement, the process did not immediately move towards substantive negotiations, while Bulgaria subsequently became the key bilateral obstacle. In its reports, the European Commission has noted that bilateral disputes affect the credibility of the enlargement process. 

However, there is no European decision guaranteeing that a change of name would automatically mean membership or the automatic opening of negotiations. As early as its 2009 recommendation to open negotiations, the Commission stressed that good-neighbourly relations and an agreed, mutually acceptable solution to the name dispute remained essential, alongside continued reforms. 

Therefore, “Brussels lied to us” is a politically motivated claim for which there is little evidence. It can be argued that the EU acted unfairly or that the process lost credibility, but that is not the same as evidence that there was a formal promise that was subsequently broken. 

   

Where do we stand today? 

In his interview with Breitbart, Mickoski describes European integration primarily as a series of disappointments and blockades by the EU. He recalls that North Macedonia was granted candidate status in 2005, later changed its name under the Prespa Agreement and, according to his version of events, was told this would be the “last thing” it needed to do. He then says France called for a new change in methodology, followed by Bulgaria’s demand for constitutional amendments. Mickoski presents this as evidence that the EU is constantly setting new obstacles and that North Macedonia was “lied to” by Brussels. But this account leaves out an important piece of information: North Macedonia is not a country without a decision to begin the accession process. 

In March 2020, the European Council approved the decision to open accession negotiations with North Macedonia. In July 2022, the first intergovernmental conference was held, and the screening process began that same month. The screening process was completed in December 2023. 

The 2022 conclusions provide for North Macedonia to make constitutional amendments extending the Constitution to include citizens belonging to other peoples, including Bulgarians. In its 2025 report, the European Commission noted that no attempts had been made to adopt these amendments and that decisive steps were needed to move the process forward. 

The reason cannot be reduced to the Bulgarian veto alone. Under the agreed negotiating framework, North Macedonia is required to make constitutional amendments extending the Constitution to include citizens belonging to other peoples, including Bulgarians. 

Therefore, the spin in the interview is not necessarily the claim that Bulgaria represents a problem — it is a real political obstacle. The problem lies in reducing the entire European integration process to a story in which North Macedonia is merely a victim of ever-changing demands from Brussels and Sofia, without mentioning that the current negotiating framework also contains a specific obligation that the country itself must fulfil. 

And this is precisely where the difference lies between a political interpretation and the facts on the ground: the EU has its own responsibilities and political decisions that can be criticised, but North Macedonia also has formally undertaken obligations, and without fulfilling them, the process cannot move on to the next stage. 

This is where the potential risks related to compliance with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) become important. Openly positioning oneself against EU policies could affect our level of alignment with the CFSP, which is a strict criterion that Brussels regularly assesses in its progress reports. 

The government’s close political contacts with circles around US conservatives close to Trump do not in themselves constitute a departure from the CFSP. However, a risk could arise if this political positioning turns into disagreement with specific EU positions, declarations, or restrictive measures. Alignment with the CFSP is a measurable criterion in the accession process, and North Macedonia has maintained full alignment in this area in its screening reports from 2022 onwards, including the 2025 report. In February 2026, the Stabilisation and Association Committee explicitly welcomed North Macedonia’s “continued full alignment” with the CFSP. 

  

The US is an ally, but how important is it for European integration? 

In the interview, Mickoski clearly presents the Donald Trump administration and the United States as the “highest priority,” while describing EU membership as a “second milestone.” There is nothing inherently problematic about deepening relations with Washington — North Macedonia is a NATO member, has a strategic partnership with the United States, and is fully entitled to seek greater American support for its security, economy and infrastructure. But how exactly is this stronger turn towards Washington supposed to help North Macedonia accelerate its path towards European integration? 

In official US policy towards North Macedonia, Washington does not present our integration into Europe as an alternative to the strategic partnership with the United States. On the contrary, in the joint statement following the US–North Macedonia Strategic Dialogue on 2 June 2022, the US side explicitly stressed the importance of North Macedonia and Albania making swift progress in the EU accession process. This means that American support for Skopje has traditionally been intended to support its Euro-Atlantic orientation, rather than serve as an alternative path outside the European process. 

It is important to clarify that the Strategic Dialogue was not established under the current government. The first Strategic Dialogue between the United States and North Macedonia was held on 2 June 2022 in Washington, with the participation of the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bujar Osmani. 

This is where a fundamental gap in the interview emerges. Mickoski presents American support as an important instrument for overcoming problems with European integration, while sharply criticising Brussels, particularly the Bulgarian blockade. But he does not explain the specific mechanism through which Washington would turn its influence into progress in the accession process: direct pressure on Sofia, mediation between Skopje and Sofia, diplomatic engagement with key European capitals, or some other channel. 

This is an important distinction between political closeness and a concrete result. The United States can provide diplomatic support, investment, security cooperation and political weight. But the conditions for EU membership are determined through the European process, while decisions at key stages depend on the member states. Therefore, if the American partnership is presented as one of the main instruments for accelerating the path towards the EU, the public has the right to know exactly what Washington is expected to do, whom it should negotiate with, and what measurable result is expected. 

 

Breitbart’s ideological profile

It is important to note that the Breitbart News Network, which gave this interview to Mickoski, is profiled as a right-wing populist web platform that has been closely aligned with Trump since his first presidential campaign in 2016. It was founded by conservative commentator Andrew Breitbart and regularly publishes conservative thinkers and promoters of the political right in support of Trump and the MAGA movement. Breitbart focuses on issues such as immigration and border security, criticism of Democrats and progressive policies, criticism of the mainstream media, conservative cultural issues, nationalism and national sovereignty, and support for conservatives and populists close to Trump.

Media Bias/Fact Check, an organization that assesses media bias, says that Breitbart’s reporting is “right-wing,” but also that it often mixes facts with unsubstantiated opinions, giving it a “low credibility” rating.

Mickoski’s interview with Breitbart is in line with his political lobbying efforts with the Trump administration, most openly expressed during his visit to Washington for the inauguration of the US president for his second term in early 2025.

“We had meetings that were visible and publicly announced, but also meetings with people who will hold senior positions within President Trump’s circle in the coming period. Anyone who fights for and succeeds in gaining the attention of the Trump administration will come into its focus. We want to earn that attention, which is why we were there. We went there to present who we are and what we are, there is no second chance to make a first impression. We held historic meetings and made a historic visit. I am sure that Macedonia has come into the focus of the people who are the most vocal within President Trump’s circle. I am convinced that after this, Macedonia is part of the new administration’s focus,” Mickoski said at the time.

Mickoski’s subsequent meetings with Chris Pavlovski, Howard Lutnick, Devin Nunes and Richard Grenell can convincingly be described as political and business networking with figures from the conservative ecosystem close to Trump. ProPublica notes that Pavlovski, Nunes, and Lutnick were part of the same circle around Trump, and that their visit to North Macedonia took place at a time when Trump was once again running for president. At the same time, Grenell acted as an informal/“semi-official” envoy for Trump to foreign political actors.

This strategy of seeking support through conservative networks in the US is identical to the one used by former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, particularly in the final years of his long tenure, and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. In addition, the interview has a strong domestic dimension, aimed at creating the impression among the Macedonian public that the current government is accepted by high-level international political circles, both among traditional VMRO-DPMNE supporters and among the country’s populist Trump enthusiasts.

   

“Unconditional” support at the UN

Mickoski says that North Macedonia stood “unconditionally” behind Trump’s policies at the UN, even when doing so was politically unpopular.

There are specific votes on which Skopje and Washington have aligned, but that does not mean there is complete alignment on all issues. On 24 February 2025, for example, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on Ukraine by a large majority, while North Macedonia and the US were among those abstaining. However, on another resolution on Ukraine on the same day, North Macedonia voted “in favour,” while the US voted “against.”

Therefore, “unconditionally” is too broad a characterization. More importantly, alignment with Washington’s position on a particular vote is not, in itself, evidence that it advances North Macedonia’s European integration.

The same applies to the claim that North Macedonia is open to US military aircraft landing, staying, and continuing on to the Gulf. This may be an expression of a close alliance with the US, but Mickoski does not explain what the country specifically gains from this policy, either from a security or economic perspective, and especially not from the perspective of European integration. The fact that Skopje facilitates Washington’s interests does not in itself prove that Washington, in return, can or will help overcome the obstacles the country faces on its path to the EU. This is precisely where the answer to the question is missing: how does this loyalty to the US translate into a concrete interest for North Macedonia?

   

Antimony: a real American project, but not an operational mine

A similar gap between the political presentation and the actual status can be seen in the case of antimony. Mickoski says that the US DFC is already financing an important mining project and that North Macedonia will mine the antimony, which will then be sent to the US for the production of military equipment.

The project does indeed exist, but its status is more modest than the statement suggests. In April 2026, the US DFC signed an agreement with Pela Global to develop the project and provided $5 million for activities aimed at establishing its technical and commercial feasibility and preparing the project for potential construction. This means that there is a real US investment in a project under development, but not an already operational mine or active production.

There is no dispute that there is concrete US involvement, but it is misleading to present funding for the preparation of a potential project as an already established production and export chain to the US. For the political message that North Macedonia is becoming an important US partner, this is a significant distinction.

   

The economic reality: the EU remains the main partner

In the interview, Mickoski emphasizes the potential for greater economic cooperation with the US. Diversification is a legitimate policy, but it does not change the EU’s current economic weight.

According to the European Commission, in 2024, the EU accounted for 61.4% of North Macedonia’s total trade in goods, 76.9% of Macedonian exports went to the EU, while 50.5% of imports came from the EU. EU countries also accounted for 44% of foreign direct investment inflows in 2024, while the EU-27’s share of the total stock of foreign direct investment reached 67%.

This does not mean that the country should not develop investment and trade with the US. It simply means that the US partnership cannot be presented economically as a substitute for European integration.

The most important spin in the interview is not the claim that North Macedonia should maintain close ties with the US. That partnership can be beneficial for security, investment, and economic diversification. The problem arises when political closeness with Washington is presented as if it were, in itself, a new mechanism for resolving the European integration process.

North Macedonia can be both a strong US ally and continue on its path to the EU. But the latter involves specific procedures, conditions and decisions. At present, these include the constitutional amendments agreed as part of the negotiating framework, as well as progress in the rule of law, judicial independence, the fight against corruption and other areas of reform.

Therefore, the real question is not “US or EU?” The question is: If the US and the Trump administration are the “top priority,” what concrete result of that policy will move North Macedonia closer to the EU?

If there is an American diplomatic strategy for overcoming the dispute with Bulgaria, it should be explained. If American investment and security cooperation are expected to increase the country’s political weight in Europe, it should be shown how. And if the strategy is parallel: strong partnership with the US while simultaneously fulfilling European obligations, then this should be clearly stated. And, of course, European partners should be treated as genuine partners, unnecessary risks should be avoided, and strategic partners should not be unduly favored in ways that could lead to negative consequences in the future.

The facts show that the US partnership can strengthen the European path, but it is not a substitute for it.

 

 

 

 

 

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